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1. Introduction 
In the last few years the United States Social Security Old Age Benefit system has undergone 
some of the most important changes since its inception. We have seen, in a short period of time, 
the implementation of the phased increase in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) with the 
resulting increase in the penalty for claiming benefits early, the elimination of the Earnings Test 
(ET) for those above the NRA, and the incremental increase in the Delayed Retirement Credit 
(DRC) for those claiming benefits after the NRA. 
The changes in the NRA, and the most recent changes in the DRC are the result of the 
reforms signed into law by President Reagan in 1983 following the recommendations of the 
National Commission on Social Security Reform chaired by Alan Greenspan, while the removal 
of the ET is a more recent development, introduced in the last year of Clinton’s presidency, and 
was likely rather unexpected for the average American. There is relatively little research 
analyzing the consequences of all these changes, mainly because of how recent they are, but also 
because of the difficulty identifying the likely contribution of all these changes to variables of 
interest like labor supply and claiming behavior using publicly available household level data. 
In this paper we use aggregate data from the Social Security Administration’s Annual 
Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, and Micro Data from the Public-Use 
extracts from the Master Beneficiary Record to uncover a number of interesting trends in benefit 
claiming behavior and level of benefits receipt, which can help us understand how the changes in 
the system are shaping the retirement benefits claiming behavior of Older Americans.  
These data sources, while highly reliable for the study of claiming behavior, have the 
disadvantage of not allowing us to control for the usually long list of socio-demographic and 
socio-economic variables, or analyze other relevant variables of interest like labor supply. This 
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means that there is potentially a large amount of heterogeneity which in other studies would be 
observable and that remains unobservable for us. However, we find that our ability to access 
detailed information on claiming behavior and the level of benefits resulting from that benefit 
application, allows us to provide a realistic and surprisingly illuminating picture of how changes 
in the system are affecting claiming behavior, which suggest a large explanatory power intrinsic 
in accurately observing the self-selection into claiming, and the importance of properly 
understanding the complex set of incentives involved in people’s decision to apply for retirement 
benefits at a given age. 
Our analysis finds significant effects of the removal of the earnings test, with a large and 
significant short run effect of the abolition of the ET on the claiming behavior of Older 
Americans,1 and a significant and longer lived effect on the composition of those claiming and 
their levels of benefits received after age 65. We also find significant effects in the levels of 
benefits received by early claimers, especially males, as a result of the increase in the NRA, but a 
hardly noticeable effect of the increases in the DRC. 
Section 2 presents a discussion of the incentive structure provided by the Social Security 
Old Age system, and Section 3 gives information about the data sets used in the analysis. Section 
4 reports our main findings, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Retirement Benefits: An overview 
Public pensions are a major income source for older Americans, and under the Old Age and 
Survivor Insurance (OASI) system, the Social Security Administration paid about $449.2 billion 
dollars during 2006 to almost 41 million beneficiaries. Given its importance it is not surprising 
                                                 
1 The results on claiming behavior are very similar to those discussed in a recent paper by Song and Manchester 
(2007b) using the same data but different empirical strategies. 
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that the discussion over the need of reforms to the system have gone on for a long time. Since the 
1970s reforming Social Security has been a priority among economic researchers and policy 
makers. In fact, the 1983 Amendments were meant to solve the financial crisis that Social 
Security was headed for. And while it was clear within a decade that they were not going to be 
nearly enough, the reforms resulting from those Amendments have started to take effect during 
the last few years, as the discussion on possible reforms continues. 
Social Security provides fairly complex incentives that undoubtedly affect the labor supply 
and benefit uptake behavior of individuals starting at the Early Retirement Age (ERA), and 
continuing until age 70.2 Retirement benefits at all ages are intimately linked to a person’s 
earnings history, but also to a fairly large number of provisions that compute the benefits a 
person receives as a function of the following:3  
• a person’s thirty-five highest years of earnings, conditional on having at least 40 quarters 
of covered earnings, which loosely translates into 10 years of paid work. Any years 
without covered earnings go into the formula as a zero. 
• indexing factors to adjust past earnings to current wage levels. These factors are to reflect 
the changes in general wage levels over the years, and use income tax data. 
• a progressive formula that uses bend points (which are indexed to the growth rate in 
average covered earnings and therefore change every year) and marginal replacement 
rates (which are fixed) by indexed earnings brackets to compute the Primary Insurance 
                                                 
2 After age 70 there is little incentive to delay claiming benefits given that the Delayed Retirement Credit provision 
stops at that time, and therefore any individual claiming after age 70 would receive less in present value for any life 
expectancy the person might have, or any length of life he or she might end up having. 
3 Our presentation here is trying to be as clear and simple as possible and not necessarily comprehensive of all the 
possible details and exceptions to the general rules of the system. For an encyclopedic presentation of the rules of 
the system we refer the reader to Myers (1993), and also to the Social Security website at www.ssa.gov 
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Amount (PIA). The latter is the level of benefits a person receives if he or she claims 
benefits at the NRA. 
• the Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF), which determines the reduction in benefits that 
individuals face if they claim benefits early (which is permanent unless the person earns 
in some month above the earnings test limits and gets checks withheld. In that case, as 
explained below, there will be a recalculation of this factor when the person reaches the 
NRA). This reduction factor changes depending on the NRA the individual is subject to. 
For a person reaching age 62 in 2008 (when the NRA reached 66) the reduction factor is 
0.75, and it will be 0.7 when the NRA reaches age 67. Given that individuals can claim in 
any given month after they reach age 62, the reduction factor is 5/9 of 1 percent during 
the first 36 months before the NRA, and 5/12 of 1 percent for the months above 36. 
• the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) which determines the upward adjustment of 
benefits if individuals claim after the NRA. For those born in 1943 or later it is 2/3 of 1 
percent for each month up to age 70. For those born before 1943 it ranges from 11/24 to 
5/8 of 1 percent per month, depending on their birth year. 
• the earnings levels between the time the person claims benefits and reaches the NRA, in 
order to apply the Earnings Test and withhold benefits if necessary. Therefore, the 
exempt amounts matter and they are different in the period between the ERA and the year 
the person reaches the NRA, and after.4 
                                                 
4 The exempt amount for the period between the month of claiming and the year the person reaches the NRA is 
$13,560 in 2008, and for every dollar earned above this limit the government withholds 50 cents of benefits. A 
higher exempt amount, $36,120 applies in the year of attaining NRA, for months prior to such attainment. For the 
latter case the withholding is of 1 dollar for every 3 dollars earned above this limit.  
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• the number of monthly checks withheld because of the Earnings Test. They are used once 
the person reaches the NRA to compute the upward adjustment to the ARF to compensate 
for the withheld benefits.5 
Underlying all these factors, and especially those that require adjustments due to early or 
late (with respect to the NRA) claiming of benefits, is the concept of actuarial fairness. While 
this is a rather elusive term, given how long ago some of these adjustment factors were decided 
and the reasoning behind them, the idea is that an individual with a life expectancy at the average 
of the population should be indifferent between claiming early at a reduced rate, and claiming at 
any point after that.6 In budgetary terms it means that no additional cost to the system arises on 
account of early (or late) retirement.7 However, it should come as no surprise that empirically we 
will observe in our analysis that actuarial fairness, while it goes a long way in explaining 
disparities in benefit levels, does not perfectly account for the different claiming behavior of 
older Americans, even when we observe population data that allows us to use law of large 
numbers arguments to approximate aggregate behavior. The reason is that there are many other 
factors potentially affecting claiming behavior, some of them relatively well understood, others 
object of current and future research.  
A large literature in the Economics of Aging has been investigating for decades the links 
between a variety of important variables like labor supply, claiming behavior, wealth 
                                                 
5 This is a very important characteristic of the Earnings Test provisions, and too often misunderstood or ignored both 
by researchers and experts. Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2007, and 2008) present a good discussion and analysis of 
this important feature. Leonesio (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier (1991), and Gruber and Orszag (2003) describe 
this feature but do not study it in detail. For the most recent evidence of how widely misunderstood this feature is we 
refer the reader to a recent article by Stan Hinden, which appears in page 23 of AARP’s Bulletin in October of 2007. 
Most of the other research on the ET has focused on the taxation aspects, see Vroman (1985), Burtless and Moffitt 
(1985), Honig and Reimers (1989), Leonesio (1990), Reimers and Honig (1993 and 1996), Friedberg (1998 and 
2000), Baker and Benjamin (1999), and Votruba (2003). 
6 Crawford and Lilien (1981), and Gustman and Steinmeier (1991) question the actuarial fairness of the system at 
the individual level, even if it has some bite at the aggregate level. 
7 Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) review, with an applied approach, this and other related concepts using data from 
a number of OECD countries. Breyer and Hupfeld (2007) provide a more theoretical discussion to understand the 
redistributive effects of early retirement provisions. 
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accumulation, and consumption of individuals, and the many aspects underlying the rules of the 
system summarized above. 8  While it seems clear from that research that Social Security 
incentives are intimately linked to individuals’ behavior during their retirement years, it is quite 
complicated to pinpoint how the current changes in the rules are affecting and will be affecting 
those variables of interest. 
The latter should come as no surprise given the short time since some of these changes 
started to take place, and the fact that they are still happening. These complications are 
exemplified by the three types of policy changes we focus on in this paper, and that we explain 
in more detail in the remainder of this section: The changes in the NRA, which affect the 
reduction factors when individuals claim early; the changes in the adjustments due to late 
claiming of benefits; and the removal of the Earnings Test for those above the NRA. The 
aggregate data we use in this research, and the administrative publicly available extract of the 
Master Beneficiary Record, can be used to characterized some of the consequences of these 
changes, and provide insightful discussions of how possible reforms will likely affect the 
claiming behavior of older Americans. 
The 1983 Social Security Amendments signed by President Reagan in April of 1983, which 
resulted from the recommendations of the National Commission on Social Security Reform, 
included, among other measures, the change in the NRA starting with the cohort turning 62 in 
the year 2000 (those born in 1938), for whom the NRA was set at 65 and 2 months. The NRA 
has increased by 2 months for every cohort since then until it reached 66 for those that turn 62 in 
2005, and will stay at that level for a decade. Then for the cohort born in 1955, who will turn 62 
                                                 
8 For a survey of this broad literature see Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999). Hurd (1990), Lumsdaine (1995), and 
Ruhm (1996) provide good discussions of the earlier literature. The most up to date and ambitious efforts to model 
retirement behavior under uncertainty can be found in Rust and Phelan (1997), who do focus on claiming behavior 
along with labor supply decisions, and also French (2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), Blau (2008), and 
Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006). 
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in 2017, it will increase again by two months, and will continue to do so every year until it 
reaches 67. The Amendments also included a phased increase in the Delayed Retirement Credit, 
with the clear objective of fostering work after the NRA. The DRC started to increase by half a 
percentage point for those attaining age 65 in 1990-91, and has increased by a half percentage 
point every two years, reaching 8% for the cohort that will turn 65 in 2008, level at which it will 
stay until a further reform considers changing it. 
The changes in the NRA and the DRC were clearly easy to anticipate by those nearing 
retirement age, and it is natural to expect comparatively less pronounced changes in behavior 
resulting from their phased implementation.9 More unexpected was the repeal of the Earnings 
Test for individuals above the NRA, which withholds benefits for individuals earning above the 
exempt amounts. The legislation was passed in the spring of 2000, around a year after it was 
made a policy objective by President Clinton in early 1999, and affected earnings obtained 
starting January 1, 2000. The literature analyzing the effects of the earnings test is also quite 
large, and has focused primarily on understanding whether people respond to the exempt 
amount. Only recently (Benítez-Silva and Heiland 2007 and 2008) researchers have emphasized 
the nearly actuarial fairness of the ET, and have connected its fairly complex incentives with the 
early claiming behavior of older Americans. Given the data we are analyzing, we are in a 
position to infer possible changes in behavior due to the repeal of the ET, which would otherwise 
be hard to characterize with any household level data. 
 
 3. Data  
We use aggregate historical data from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security 
Bulletin and the 2004 publicly available release of the OASDI Public-Use Microdata Files, to 
                                                 
9 See Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) for an early discussion of the possible consequences of the 1983 reforms. 
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analyze the trends in claiming behavior and level of benefits received in the 1994 to 2004-2006 
period. These two sources of data are intimately related since they come from the same Master 
Beneficiary Record of all Americans that contribute to the Social Security system, but they 
present information in a slightly different way, complementing each other in very interesting 
ways. 
In particular, the information we use from the Supplement is reported in Table 6.A4 of the 
2007 edition, and in similar tables in the historical editions of the document. The table reports the 
exact number of Americans claiming retirement benefits at each age in a given year, and also the 
average benefit level for those claiming at a particular age in that particular year.10 
Table 1 below shows the proportion of individuals claiming Social Security Retirement 
benefits by age for the 1994 to 2006 period, as well as the total number of individuals that 
claimed in a given year. The total number of claimants that we use in order to compute the 
proportions does not include the disability conversions at age 65 (or the NRA if higher), but does 
include the relatively small number of individuals who claim at age 70 or above, for whom for 
simplicity we do not include proportions in the table. 
Table 2 presents the Social Security beneficiaries’ monthly benefits by age and year 1994 to 
2006 adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), such that the benefits levels are all reported in 
dollars of 2005. However, those benefits are not actuarially comparable, because individuals 
retiring at the NRA get 100 percent of their PIA, while those claiming before their NRA are 
getting less than 100 percent of their PIA due to the ARF that their benefits are subject to, while 
those retiring after the NRA increase their benefits to be more than 100 percent of their PIA due 
to the adjustments of the DRC. In order to truly compare these benefits levels we have to take 
                                                 
10 This means that a given individual only appears in one of the cells identified by age and year, and that 
corresponds to the first time they apply for benefits. 
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into account the adjustments to their PIA such that the dollar amounts by column and rows are in 
the same actuarial units.11 The idea is that while a person who claims at age 62 will mechanically 
have a lower monthly benefit than a person who claims at age 65 but has the same earnings 
history, the early claimer receives three more years of benefits, and therefore in present value at 
the actuarial adjustment factor, and assuming that they will live to the same age, their benefit 
level is actuarially equivalent. 
The complication is that the adjustment factors have changed considerably in the period of 
analysis resulting from the policy changes we have discussed. We present their evolution in 
Table 4, and then use them to obtain the ARF-DRC adjusted or actuarially adjusted (and inflation 
adjusted) level of benefits in Table 3.  
These benefits can now be compared, with the theory in mind that in the absence of self-
selection (which embeds individual heterogeneity, which includes for example differential 
mortality expectations, health status, and earnings histories) the prediction would be that the 
benefit levels would not change by age, and would only change by column due to time and 
cohort effects, where the former includes policy changes and macroeconomic effects.12 
While in the next section we will describe the results in some detail, here we want to 
emphasize a couple of important weaknesses of these data. First, the information for retired 
                                                 
11 We are essentially backing out the average PIA by age and year for those applying in this period. Notice that this 
information is not provided in the Supplement. Our calculation is likely to differ from the actual PIAs for two 
reasons. First, in our calculations it is assumed that individuals claim exactly on their birthdays (or in the month they 
reach the NRA for claimers who are 65 in 2003 or later), which means that for those claiming in the months in 
between birthdays our calculation will use an actuarial reduction factor that is too small, which will result in an 
adjusted benefit that is higher than the PIA. Second, the benefit level reported in the Supplement is taking into 
account the effect of the Earnings Test, but since the earnings test is approximately actuarially fair, our adjustment 
delivers an approximation that is too low compared with the true PIA. Since these effects go in different directions, 
it is an empirical question whether our approximation of the PIA is upwards or downwards biased. We will be able 
to directly compare our approximation with the PIA when using the Public-Use Micro Data extract. 
12 This means that if individuals were randomly assigned to claiming at a given age between say age 62 and age 70, 
and without the existence of any policy changes in this period, the benefit levels (on average) in a given year for the 
different ages should be identical, and the differences over time could only be explained by time effects (macro 
effects but not related to Social Security reforms) or cohort effects. 
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workers and dependents is not presented separately, meaning that the information we provide in 
Tables 1 to 3 includes individuals who are claiming on their spouses’ earnings histories. Second, 
while the information presented in Table 2, and especially Table 3 is of substantial interest, it is 
essentially impossible to make any statistical argument about the differences in benefits levels 
since we only have information about the mean of the distribution of benefits by age, but not 
about the standard deviation, preventing us from utilizing the data to make any inference about 
the statistical differences we see in the table. Fortunately, both of these drawbacks can be 
overcome by using the OASDI Public-Use Microdata File. 
The 2004 Benefits and Earnings Public-Use File is a one-percent random sample of OASDI 
beneficiaries who were on the Social Security records in December 2004.  It contains 473,366 
records as of December 2004, and includes information in sixteen fields on OASDI 
beneficiaries’ characteristics, mainly about benefits entitlements. This more detailed information 
allows us to focus only on retired workers who claimed on their own earnings history, and since 
it is individual level we can compute standard deviations and therefore statistically compared 
benefit levels across ages and years. This micro data has, however, two weaknesses. First, we 
have not been able to separate disability conversions from new entitlements for those claiming at 
age 65 (or the NRA, if higher). While the Master Beneficiary Record apparently has (as 
explained to us by SSA personnel) variables which probably allow for this distinction, the 
Public-Use files do not. What we have done to overcome this problem is to assume a proportion 
of Social Security claimants from age-65 samples, each year as disability converters. The 
proportions used are calculated according to the Annual Statistical Supplemental. Second, since 
we are restricting attention to individuals in the Master Beneficiary Record as of December of 
2004. The latter likely results in a selection bias when looking at historical data on individuals 
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that claim in the decade before that. The reason is that some individuals who claim in the 1990s, 
or even more recently, might not be in the sample if they have died in the time since their 
application for benefits.13 Tables 5 to 13 present the analysis using the Microdata File. 
 
4. Claiming Behavior and Retirement Benefits 
From the data provided in the Statistical Supplement we can clearly see the well known 
retirement peaks at age 62 and 65. It is interesting to highlight, however, that the relative sizes of 
these peaks have changed considerably from previous decades, where the largest peak was at age 
65 in the 1970s, or were roughly of similar size during part of the 1980s. In the period we are 
analyzing we see that the proportion of individuals claiming at age 62 has remained quite stable, 
moving in most years in the 55% to 60% range, with the proportion of individuals claiming 
before the NRA at almost 75% by 2005, and just below by 2006.  
This is quite a remarkable development of the last two decades, and one that has puzzled 
economists considerably.14 Until recently a number of researchers have tried to explain this with 
arguments regarding individuals preferences (Coile et al. 2002, and Gustman and Steinmeier 
2002), suggesting that there is a proportion of individuals who seem to be rather myopic and do 
not quite behave as forward looking optimizers. Other authors have recently shown that once the 
full incentive structure of the system is properly modeled (mainly regarding the Earnings Test 
provisions) these proportions are much more consistent with the predictions of a fully dynamic 
                                                 
13 This selection bias is not present in the aggregate data using the Supplement since it reports yearly, not 
retrospective, data. It is natural to expect an upward bias in the retrospective adjusted benefits levels in the micro 
data, and this is what we conclude from comparing that data to the Supplement. 
14 Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) using 2002 mortality data, find that the US reduction for early retirement is not 
actuarially fair (it is too low), and too generous given current mortality figures, which results in a subsidy of early 
retirement and a penalization of late retirement. This can in part explain the preference for early retirement 
expressed by Americans in the last decades, and also some of our results on benefits levels, since higher income 
individuals, likely to live longer, are the ones benefiting the most from this low reduction. The authors also find, 
based on the same mortality data, that the Delayed Retirement Credit is nearly actuarially fair. 
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intertemporal model of behavior than previously thought (Benítez-Silva and Heiland 2007), and 
in some cases can be replicated if beliefs regarding the future ability of the system to pay 
benefits are accounted for (Benítez-Silva et al. 2007).15 
From Table 1, and Figure 1 which portrays in graphical form the information in the table, 
the most remarkable percentages are those referring to the year 2000. The proportions of 
individuals claiming at different ages changed dramatically that year, with a large drop in the 
proportion claiming at age 62 (from almost 59% to under 52%), and a sharp increase in those 
claiming at age 65 and above. This year was the one that started to implement the increase in the 
NRA and continue to implement the increases in the DRC, but also the year in which the 
Earnings Test was repealed. While the increase in the NRA is unlikely to have much of an effect 
in this case, given that it only affected those turning 62 in the year 2000 who faced an increase in 
the NRA of only 2 months, an explanation linked to the elimination of the ET seems much more 
reasonable. In fact, while the proportions changed considerably, the fact is that the number of 
individuals claiming (not shown in the table) by age did not change much, except for those at age 
65 (by around 200,000 people compared with the previous periods for this age in that year, 
which explains the large jump in the total number of claimants that we do show in Table 1) to 69. 
These increases are larger than those described in Song (2004), but more in line with those 
described in Song and Manchester (2007a), and suggest that individuals reacted to the 
elimination of the ET quite sharply, and in accordance with a policy that eliminates any link 
between claiming benefits and labor earnings. These results are very much in line with those 
recently reported in Song and Manchester (2007b), who using the same data focus on the 
claiming behavior of individuals after the elimination of the earnings test for those above the 
                                                 
15 In a recent New York Times article, May 12 2007, Laurence J. Kotlikoff argues in favor of late claiming of 
benefits by those that hold relatively large private pension assets. This is also defended by the same researcher along 
with others in a recent U.S. News and World Report article, February 11, 2008. 
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NRA.16 In the years since that change, the proportions of individuals claiming at age 62 has 
come back up (although it has dropped again in 2006) even as the penalty for claiming early has 
become higher, while the proportion claiming at age 65 has stayed at higher levels. In the 
meantime the proportions of those claiming after age 65 has come back to pre-2000 levels and 
even gone lower, suggesting a very small effect of the increases in the DRC on claiming 
behavior.17 
 In Table 2 and 3 we turn to analyzing the trends in the level of benefits received by 
individuals who claim benefits in the period of analysis. As mentioned in the previous section, 
by looking at the raw numbers (only inflation adjusted), without adjusting for the ARF and DRC 
that individuals face, can be very misleading, and the large variations in benefits levels we 
observe in Table 2 are considerably reduced once we adjust those amounts as presented in Table 
3. It is clear that accounting for the actuarially fair nature of the ARF and the DRC changes the 
picture a bit and while the numbers in the table are hardly the same by columns or by rows, the 
differences have been reduced considerably, and likely put to rest the idea that early retirees are 
comparatively (and on average) much worse off than those claiming later in terms of benefits 
received from the Social Security Administration. The conventional wisdom that described early 
retirees as a “at risk” population has been questioned in different degrees by a number of 
researchers (Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips 1996, Smith 1999, Leonesio, Vaughan, and Wixon 
                                                 
16 In principle, we cannot rule out possible period effects resulting from at least two aspects; First, the focal point of 
the year 2000 as the arrival of the new Millennium could have lead some individuals to postpone their retirement 
(claiming of benefits) until this memorable date. Second, the new decade came with the burst of the technology 
bubble and a slowdown in job growth after the robust growth of the late 1990s, this change in trend could have made 
some individuals consider claiming retirement as their expectations of future income growth became less optimistic. 
17 See also Gustman and Steinmeier (2004), Song (2004), and French (2005), for discussions of the likely 
consequences of the removal of the ET.  
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2000, and Mitchell and Phillips 2000) but not in terms of the level of benefits they receive.18 A 
possible explanation behind the existence of that conventional wisdom, is that it was developed 
in a period of time in which claiming early was relatively less common. With 73.2% of 
Americans currently claiming before the NRA (OASDI Monthly Statistics, percentage as of 
November 2007) it is hardly surprising that the range of characteristics of these retirees covers 
the spectrum of the population. 
The most striking result coming out of this table, which becomes even clearer from 
Figure 2, is also one of the main results of this paper, and is that the level of benefits received by 
those claiming benefits after age 65 decreased sharply after the year 2000, and for a while 
become increasingly different from the benefits received by those 62 to 65. The difference from 
the pre-2000 period, when benefits levels at all ages move within around 100 dollars is quite 
remarkable. Those 62 to 65 has seen a sizable upward trend in their benefits levels possibly 
resulting from the increase in the NRA. With the elimination of the Earnings Test it seems that 
the composition in terms of earnings histories of those claiming after age 65 has changed 
considerably and now is composed in a higher proportion of individuals trying to catch up after 
having had sketchy careers or relatively low earnings histories, while before the year 2000 there 
were more high earners maybe focused on the short term consequences of the ET provisions.19 
Notice the sharp upward trend of the benefits received by those age 65, but also for those older 
                                                 
18 More recently Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Sherlund (2006) analyze whether early retirees will be able to 
maintain well being during retirement. Given the data they use, little is discussed regarding level of benefits, and 
they do not compare early claimers with those that delay claiming benefits. 
19 The fact that the proportion of individuals claiming benefits changed considerably in the year that the ET was 
eliminated for those above the NRA, and that the composition of claimers in the post-2000 period seemed to have 
significantly changed for those claiming after age 65, is however a bit puzzling in light of the discussion of Benítez-
Silva and Heiland (2008), where they clearly show that the real incentives of the ET are very close to actuarially fair 
given the adjustment of benefits at the NRA if checks were withheld. These large shifts suggest, as discussed by 
Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2007), a likely lack of knowledge about this important aspect of the ET provision. Those 
authors estimate that only around 40% of individuals are aware of this aspect of the rules that govern the ET. 
 16
than 65 in the last couple of years, suggesting some trend towards some convergence towards the 
pre-2000 benefits levels. 
 Ideally, we would like to be able to make statements about the statistical significance of 
the differences we observe in Table 3, but as we discussed above this is not possible given the 
data provided in the Supplement. Also, we would like to focus on retired workers that claim on 
their own histories in order to analyze a more homogeneous group of individuals. The use of the 
Public-Use Microdata File allows us to restrict attention to retired workers, and also allows us to 
compute standard deviations that provide for simple statistical tests of differences of means 
between levels of benefits. 
 Tables 5 and 6, show the percentage and numbers of retired workers claiming benefits in 
the 1994 to 2004 period. Notice that for retired workers the percentage of individuals claiming 
benefits at age 62 is smaller than what we presented in Table 1, and is only around 50%, and the 
proportion claiming at age 65 is larger and has been increasing over time, especially since the 
year 2000. At the same time, similarly to what we saw using the aggregate data, after 2000 the 
proportion of individuals claiming after age 65 (or 66 starting in 2004) is on the decline, and it 
was as of 2003 and 2004 lower than it was back in 1994. This is quite remarkable considering 
the large increases in the DRC in the 11 year span that the data covers. It is worth emphasizing 
through Table 6 that the number of individuals claiming at the different ages are in sync with the 
proportions of Table 5, except in the year 2000, when we see a large increase in the number of 
claimers exactly at age 65, and also for ages 66 and above. Again, we believe this is clearly 
linked to the abolition of the Earnings Test, and this is especially clear given that in the years 
since that change the number of claimers has remained stable at age 65, and has gone down 
considerably at older ages. 
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 One number clearly stands out in this table, and it is the very large increase in the 
proportion of individuals claiming benefits at age 66 in 2004, something considerably at odds 
with the numbers reported in the Supplement, which are supposed to be the product of 
aggregating the full micro data, of which we are using a sub-sample. The percentage claiming at 
age 66 goes up from 1.1% to 7.1% in a single year (when we divide by gender, as we will see 
later, for both males and females the proportion of individuals suddenly claiming at age 66 jumps 
by several percentage points from a very low level, from 1% to 7.6% for males, and from 1.3% 
to 6.5% for females) while the aggregate data shows no such trend in the 2003-2004 period. The 
reason for this is that the micro data seems to report differently from the Supplement the 
claiming of benefits at the NRA of 65 and 2 months for the cohort who turned 66 in the year 
2004. In the Supplement those claiming at age 65 and 2 months appear as claiming at age 65, 
while in the micro data they appear as claiming at age 66. This also explains the increasing 
percentage claiming at age 65 in the Supplement but the declining percentage claiming at the 
same age in the micro data. The advantage of the micro data is that it comes to show something 
that is well known, but elusive in this period of changing NRA, and that is that a non-trivial 
number of individuals claim benefits exactly when they turn NRA. Song and Manchester (2007b) 
present striking additional evidence to that effect. 
 Table 7 presents the actuarially (and inflation) adjusted benefit levels for retired workers 
in the 1994-2004 period, and even more clearly than when we used the Supplement data, we see 
that the levels at different ages (and for those between age 62 and 65 at different points in time) 
do not look, at first glance, so different, suggesting the considerable explanatory power of self-
selection. The main result from Table 7 is similar to the one resulting from Table 3, but now 
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even stronger.20  First, it seems that compared with the year 1999, the year 2000 was quite 
special in terms of level of benefits, with a sizable increase in the level of benefits for those 
claiming after age 65. More striking is the large drop in benefits level in the post-2000 period for 
those claiming after age 65, again suggesting that the composition of claimers has changed 
considerably since the abolition of the ET for those above the NRA.  
The Table also shows an increase in the level of benefits of those claiming between age 62 
and 65. This could be the result of a composition effect due to the increase in the NRA and the 
resulting increase in the penalty for early claiming of benefits. We can theorize that the increase 
in the penalty for claiming early can have two related effects. On the one hand, one effect (which 
we could call scale effect) should make everyone potentially interested in claiming later due to 
the fact that to reach the previous level of benefits the claiming needs to be delayed. On the other 
hand, it is possible that the change could affect lower career earners more, for whom the new 
adjusted benefits would fall short of what they consider adequate to make ends meet. The latter 
would suggest that some of those individuals would choose to delay claiming slightly, leaving a 
higher proportion of higher earners among those claiming earlier. As we will see later this 
unexpected result is mainly driven by male workers. 
A clear advantage of using micro data is that we can now compute test statistics for the 
statistical significance of these average benefits with respect to the level of those that claim, for 
example, at age 65 back in 1994, who at that time received 100% of their PIA at this age. Table 
8A reports the t-statistics for the test of equality of means between the benefits received by those 
                                                 
20 The Public-Use Micro Data files do provide the actual PIA for individuals. However, for consistency with the 
calculations using the aggregate data from the Supplement, we report here our approximations of the PIA. In Tables 
A1 and A2 in the Appendix we show the actual PIAs for the same group of individuals as Table 7, and therefore 
both set of numbers can be directly compared. It is clear that our approximation is quite close to the PIA of record, 
and the differences can be traced back, as explained above, to the timing of claiming we have assumed and the role 
of the earnings test. Notice, that the main results of our analysis are essentially unchanged. 
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claiming at age 65 in 1994 and all the other ages and time periods. Notice that in most cases even 
if the levels seem rather close they are significantly different from those received by the age 65 
claimers of 1994. In the table we can also see that the major change in the post-2000 period in 
the level of benefits received by those claiming after age 65 is highly significant. Furthermore, 
the level of benefits goes from being in a number of cases not significantly different from the 
1994 number in the pre-2000 period, to significantly higher in the year 2000, to significantly 
lower in the 2001 to 2004 period. This provides even clearer evidence of the changes resulting 
from the abolition of the ET, even in the presence of more generous DRC. 
Table 8B provides a slightly different presentation of the test of statistical significance of 
differences in means. In this case instead of using the level of benefits of those that claim at age 
65 in 1994, we use the age specific benefits levels as of 1994 to capture the variation over time 
and by age in the level of benefits.  The results are even more striking and show a clear 
divergence in the benefit levels over time for those between age 62 and 65 and those 66+. While 
for the former group the level of benefits are on the rise with increasingly statistically significant 
results, for late claimers is quite the opposite, and they are receiving much lower benefits over 
time. The breaking point is the year 2000, suggesting in even more striking fashion the effect of 
the removal of the ET in the composition of those claiming after age 65, and the effect of the 
increase in the NRA in the composition of those claiming early. 
  Tables 9 to 14 use the information in the micro data to break down the claiming 
information by gender, providing a sample of what can be gained by controlling for some of the 
heterogeneity implicit in the previous tables.21 In Tables 9 and 10, and also in Figures 3 and 4, 
we present the proportion of individuals claiming benefits by age for males and females, 
respectively. We can observe that females claim earlier than males, with a larger proportion of 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, the Public-Use Microdata file does not provide any additional characteristics of individuals. 
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them claiming at age 62, and a smaller proportion claiming at age 65. We can also see that the 
large shift in proportions in the year 2000 was much more pronounced for males, but in both 
cases the proportions seem to have reverted to pre-2000 figures by 2004, with the additional 
effect that the proportions of those claiming after age 65 have shrank for both sub-samples. The 
exception to the latter statement happens in the year 2004 (and will possibly continue into the 
future), and as we have explained for Table 5 this is due to the way (assigning them to age 66) 
the micro data records claimers that file for benefits exactly when they reach the (now higher) 
NRA. 
 Tables 11 and 12 provide the retirement benefits actuarially and inflation adjusted mean 
levels for male and female workers, which we also portray in Figures 5 and 6. A striking result 
coming out of these tables is the large difference in benefits levels, with males receiving at most 
ages and in most years much higher benefits than females, and with a much higher variance 
across ages. This comes as no surprise given what we know about the labor force participation 
and earnings of these groups during the last decades, but it is still quite remarkable. Again, we 
can also see in both tables and figures, but especially for males in Figure 5, the changing 
composition of claimers after age 65, and more clearly after the NRA, which should be 
considered to be 66 for the purposes of this table starting in 2004. The remarkable break in the 
post 65 series in the year 2000 is striking, and some ways even sharper than in the aggregate data 
presented in Table 3. We also observe in the Figures the trend towards some convergence to pre-
2000 levels of benefits, again especially for males. 
The statistical significance of the differences by gender are explored in Tables 13 and 14, 
and that analysis shows that for males the changes in the benefits levels for those claiming after 
age 65 have been especially sharp in the post-2000 period, the much lower benefits since the 
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elimination of the ET contrast with many years in which the benefits levels for those claiming at 
age 66 to 69 were not statistically significantly different from the benefits of those claiming at 
age 65 in 1994. One final important result is the significantly higher benefits level among males 
claiming at age 62 (and also 63 to 65) starting in 1999, compared with those claiming at age 65 
in 1994, likely resulting from the composition of those claiming early after the implementation 
of the increases in the NRA. This effect seems to be much smaller for women. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have used aggregate data from the Statistical Supplement to the Social Security 
Bulletin for the 1994 to 2006 period, and micro data from the OASDI Public-Use Micro data 
extract of 2004 to analyze the effects on retirement claiming behavior and level of benefits 
receipt of a number of recently introduced changes to the Social Security system. These changes 
include the increase in the Normal Retirement Age, the increase in the Delayed Retirement 
Credit, and the abolition of the Earnings Test for those above the NRA. 
 We find a large and significant short run effect of the abolition of the ET on the claiming 
behavior of Older Americans, and also a significant, and much longer lived, effect on the 
composition of those claiming benefits after age 65 in the post-2000 period, with much lower 
average benefits for late claimers compared with those claiming at other ages. Both effects are 
stronger for males than for females. We also find significant effects resulting from the changes in 
the NRA, leading to an increase in the benefits levels among early retirees, coupled with a fairly 
large proportion of individuals that still wait to exactly reach the NRA to file, which likely 
predicts a sizable shift of the traditional age 65 retirement claiming peak towards 66 (and 
eventually even 67) in the next years. Additionally, we find that the effects of the increases in the 
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DRC seem to be very small, at least in comparison with the effects of the abolition of the ET for 
those above the NRA. 
 It is important to highlight that the nature of the analysis we perform does not allow us to 
guarantee that the patterns we observe in claiming behavior and level of benefits received are 
solely the product of the policy changes. In terms of identification, other macro effects and also 
cohort effects could be driving, at least in part, the results. Given the lack of plausible reasons for 
the large differences over time and across cohorts that could be responsible for the particular 
pattern of decisions and outcomes we observe, we believe the policy changes are the most 
natural and appealing explanation. 
 Key to our analysis are the concepts of actuarial fairness and self-selection, which allow 
us to overcome, to a high degree, the impossibility to control for observed individual 
heterogeneity as it is usually done in most micro level analysis of retirement. The fact that 
individuals self-select themselves into claiming at different ages, given the well known 
adjustments to their lifetime benefits if they choose to claim at an age that is not the NRA, allows 
us to extract considerable information from the data sources we use, and provide a surprisingly 
sharp picture of the effects of policy changes, effects that have been hard to pinpoint by 
researchers using household level data. While it would be ideal to be able to control for a much 
larger array of observables in order to explain the changes we see in the data, we believe that 
even if we were able to do just that our main results would not change in a significant way. 
 Our findings should encourage researchers to use the Public-Use data provided by the 
SSA, and look closely at the wealth of data provided by the Statistical Supplement. These data 
sources can complement more traditional analysis using household level data, and provide useful 
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benchmarks for researchers modeling retirement behavior using advanced econometric and 
computational methods of analysis. 
 Our analysis is not able to illuminate one key aspect intimately linked with claiming 
behavior and benefit levels, and that is labor supply. While some recent data suggest an increase 
in the labor force participation among Older Americans, to disentangle the sources of these 
changes will likely require fairly sophisticated models of behavior, using household level data 
matched to administrative records. Those models should be able to match the patterns of 
claiming behavior and benefits levels we have described in this analysis. 
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Annual Statistical Supplement: 
1994 to 2006 Data Period          
 
              
Table 1: Proportion of New Social Security Claimants (Retired Workers and Dependents)     
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age 62 0.589 0.583 0.601 0.597 0.583 0.586 0.517 0.554 0.560 0.570 0.575 0.566 0.538
Age 63 0.079 0.079 0.075 0.074 0.080 0.080 0.067 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.083 0.0856
Age 64 0.121 0.116 0.108 0.105 0.108 0.108 0.105 0.134 0.148 0.127 0.109 0.099 0.104
Age 65 0.157 0.163 0.157 0.155 0.156 0.156 0.196 0.179 0.172 0.178 0.186 0.197 0.223
Age 66 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.039 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.011
Age 67 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.024 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
Age 68 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
Age 69 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
Total 1,444,500 1,424,800 1,396,100 1,418,900 1,441,267 1,484,600 1,758,900 1,574,000 1,595,530 1,593,2711,680,339 1,793,537 1,771,802
              
Table 2: New Social Security beneficiaries' monthly benefits. In dollars of 2005 (Retired Workers and Dependents)     
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age 62 788.58 789.53 785.31 802.01 815.35 855.64 864.56 884.42 892.58 900.40 888.31 881.90 877.98
Age 63 882.14 906.02 942.89 881.71 907.85 928.79 960.51 973.08 1,002.77 1,006.43 996.66 986.90 1009.44
Age 64 981.51 982.52 997.16 1,014.71 1,001.66 987.87 1,020.39 1,072.88 1,119.80 1,119.68 1,102.01 1,089.80 1088.58
Age 65 1,083.9 1,091.07 1,087.78 1,117.29 1,088.05 1,100.29 1,184.50 1,176.10 1,239.22 1,257.03 1,270.85 1,298.30 1335.03
Age 66 1022.36 1,077.35 1,033.01 1,049.14 1,030.42 1,093.73 1,247.67 939.56 881.73 919.08 981.26 1,052.20 1087.13
Age 67 1027.76 1,138.1 1,071.35 988.67 1,050.19 1,128.66 1,285.78 911.44 873.48 877.89 933.59 1,010.40 1012.44
Age 68 1054.12 1,052.75 1,050.56 1,017.75 1,155.86 1,080.25 1,338.41 1,033.95 903.00 886.81 909.40 960.70 973.69




Table 3: New Social Security beneficiaries' monthly benefits, 1994-2006. In dollars of 2005.  
Adjusted by ARF and DRC. (Retired Workers and Dependents) 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age 62 985.73 986.91 981.64 1,002.51 1,019.19 1,069.55 1,092.08 1,129.05 1,151.72 1,174.43 1,171.40 1,175.87 1,170.64
Age 63 1,017.85 1,045.41 1,087.95 1,017.36 1,047.52 1,071.68 1,108.28 1,137.37 1,187.49 1,207.72 1,212.15 1,216.73 1,261.80
Age 64 1,051.62 1,052.70 1,068.39 1,087.19 1,073.21 1,058.43 1,093.28 1,149.51 1,214.24 1,228.92 1,224.46 1,226.03 1,240.15
Age 65 1,083.90 1,091.07 1,087.78 1,117.29 1,088.05 1,100.29 1,184.50 1,176.10 1,239.22 1,271.15 1,299.73 1,343.07 1,397.12
Age 66 983.04 1,030.96 988.53 999.18 981.35 1,036.71 1,182.63 886.38 831.82 862.99 930.84 1005.29 1050.37
Age 67 951.63 1,053.80 991.99 915.44 972.40 1,045.06 1,190.54 843.93 808.78 812.86 864.44 902.81 906.66
Age 68 953.95 939.96 938.00 896.70 1,018.38 939.35 1,163.83 887.51 775.11 751.53 770.68 803.93 822.26
Age 69 770.61 1,036.21 1,025.30 955.00 1,035.29 976.56 1,176.11 886.72 784.75 763.87 749.81 769.19 793.53
 
Table 4: The ARF and the DRC of retirement benefits.  
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age 62 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.792 0.783 0.775 0.767 0.758 0.750 0.750
Age 63 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.856 0.844 0.833 0.822 0.811 0.800
Age 64 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.922 0.911 0.900 0.889 0.877
Age 65 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.989 0.978 0.967 0.955
Age 66 1.040 1.045 1.045 1.050 1.050 1.055 1.055 1.060 1.060 1.065 1.054 1.0466 1.035
Age 67 1.080 1.080 1.090 1.090 1.100 1.100 1.110 1.110 1.120 1.120 1.130 1.119 1.116
Age 68 1.105 1.120 1.120 1.135 1.135 1.150 1.150 1.165 1.165 1.180 1.180 1.195 1.184
Age 69 1.140 1.140 1.160 1.160 1.180 1.180 1.200 1.200 1.220 1.220 1.240 1.240 1.260
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Figure1: Proportion of New Social Security Retirement Claimants: 1994-2006 








































































OASDI Public-Use Microdata File 2004 
 
Table 5: Proportions of New Social Security claimants. Retired workers only (Without disability converters at age 65) 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 0.523 0.512 0.511 0.518 0.518 0.503 0.452 0.490 0.483 0.487 0.496
Age 63 0.161 0.166 0.143 0.151 0.152 0.147 0.136 0.157 0.156 0.145 0.143
Age 64 0.074 0.069 0.064 0.063 0.068 0.067 0.060 0.069 0.070 0.069 0.067
Age 65 0.184 0.196 0.176 0.186 0.186 0.196 0.228 0.241 0.247 0.254 0.201
Age 66 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.027 0.043 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.071
Age 67 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.027 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004
Age 68 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.018 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
Age 69 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002
Total 10,700 11,026 11,676 11,619 12,055 13,048 14,976 13,606 13,708 14,098 14,852
Note: In the data, there is no way to separate disability converters from OA claimants at age 65. What we have done is to assume a proportion of SS claimants 
from age-65 samples each year as disability converters. The proportions used are calculated according to the Annual Statistical Supplemental. 
 
 
Table 6: Number of new claimants, retired workers only (Without disability converters at age 65) 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 5,592 5,641 5,967 6,022 6,245 6,565 6,767 6,671 6,627 6,861 7,372
Age 63 1,726 1,829 1,668 1,749 1,831 1,921 2,034 2,141 2,132 2,047 2,121
Age 64 796 762 748 733 815 877 894 933 961 971 988
Age 65 1,973 2,156 2,054 2,164 2,246 2,556 3,411 3,280 3,392 3,581 2,985
Age 66 197 220 263 246 254 358 638 117 153 162 1,052
Age 67 105 108 159 146 160 217 399 86 70 89 66
Age 68 81 73 103 99 104 142 264 67 57 71 57
Age 69 68 64 102 84 99 106 187 69 71 63 36






Table 7:  Average monthly benefits in dollars of 2005. Adjusted by the ARF and the DRC. Retired workers only. 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 1,065.91 1,039.24 1,041.99 1,050.28 1,061.61 1,112.96 1,110.40 1,137.49 1,172.71 1,181.27 1,134.81
Age 63 1,041.79 1,070.49 1,045.26 1,043.64 1,058.63 1,057.92 1,105.28 1,104.24 1,123.12 1,157.47 1,110.99
Age 64 1,089.06 1,088.86 1,095.24 1,060.10 1,056.50 1,089.29 1,101.26 1,162.92 1,186.47 1,185.22 1,182.06
Age 65 1,138.35 1,129.55 1,128.78 1,134.92 1,103.10 1,103.48 1,123.02 1,150.72 1,194.23 1,210.43 1,172.53
Age 66 1,190.88 1,080.07 1,137.30 1,090.37 1,146.25 1,161.20 1,224.59 891.68 862.49 977.08 1,134.78
Age 67 1,071.46 1,083.73 1,113.53 1,068.67 1,028.65 1,149.16 1,248.28 833.95 878.65 848.13 907.75
Age 68 1,030.63 966.00 1,009.15 1,000.26 1,002.91 1,089.51 1,213.70 847.24 748.87 730.58 774.61
Age 69 1,173.50 1,171.31 1,012.89 997.81 998.48 1,088.88 1,149.75 873.58 840.28 694.77 838.93
 
Table 8A: t-statistics of Social Security monthly benefits.  Benefits of those Age 65 in 1994 used as comparison 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 -13.4805 -18.8968 -19.0375 -17.0784 -14.8081 -4.7205 -5.1620 -0.1537 5.7532 7.3185 -0.6521
Age 63 -10.7386 -7.5375 -10.1821 -10.6993 -8.8523 -8.7318 -3.5480 -3.6254 -1.5533 1.8736 -2.7303
Age 64 -3.5988 -3.5065 -2.9701 -5.2823 -5.9061 -3.5680 -2.6853 1.7147 3.3087 3.0444 2.8563
Age 65  -1.0169 -1.0494 -0.3811 -4.1109 -4.4248 -2.2722 1.7050 7.3361 9.1248 3.9703
Age 66 1.6634 -1.8287 -0.0406 -1.5536 0.2626 0.8813 4.7070 -5.1937 -6.8857 -3.8777 -0.2644
Age 67 -1.4849 -1.1258 -0.6589 -1.6699 -2.8487 0.3316 4.5750 -6.4220 -4.4015 -5.3363 -3.7827
Age 68 -1.7849 -2.6873 -2.6178 -2.9188 -2.7914 -1.1290 2.3995 -5.0251 -7.3427 -7.5304 -6.9266
Age 69 0.6060 0.5722 -2.7263 -2.5275 -2.8545 -1.0505 0.3075 -5.0385 -5.5857 -8.7639 -5.0799
 
Table 8B: t-statistics of Social Security monthly benefits. The 1994 benefits levels used as comparison 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62  -5.0854 -4.7262 -3.0317 -0.8293 8.7489 8.2168 12.7966 17.8826 19.6706 12.6929
Age 63  3.1878 0.3795 0.2090 1.8700 1.7511 6.8118 6.6375 8.2948 11.3359 6.9055
Age 64  -0.0142 0.4258 -1.9550 -2.3494 0.0167 0.8833 5.1546 6.6978 6.2461 6.0776
Age 65  -1.0169 -1.0494 -0.3811 -4.1109 -4.4248 -2.2722 1.7050 7.3361 9.1248 3.9703
Age 66  -3.4769 -2.0748 -3.2545 -1.4839 -1.1444 1.8398 -6.2997 -8.1969 -5.1407 -4.1568
Age 67  0.2529 1.1169 -0.0669 -1.1116 2.3824 7.3587 -5.0108 -3.2678 -4.1064 -2.6854
Age 68  -1.0077 -0.4352 -0.6420 -0.5713 1.3613 5.8301 -3.1657 -5.3119 -5.5411 -4.8753
Age 69  -0.0380 -3.4901 -3.1597 -3.5718 -1.7969 -0.6406 -5.7073 -6.2444 -9.4584 -5.6763
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Table 9: New Male claimants, proportions, 1994-2004 (w/o DI conversions) 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 0.489 0.480 0.509 0.500 0.491 0.473 0.414 0.453 0.460 0.465 0.478
Age 63 0.162 0.170 0.150 0.158 0.163 0.152 0.137 0.163 0.160 0.148 0.142
Age 64 0.081 0.072 0.072 0.066 0.071 0.072 0.061 0.075 0.073 0.073 0.072
Age 65 0.207 0.215 0.201 0.208 0.207 0.212 0.248 0.273 0.275 0.282 0.219
Age 66 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.033 0.054 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.076
Age 67 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.031 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.004
Age 68 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.021 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002
Age 69 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001
# of Claimants 5,766 5,911 6,001 6,073 6,344 6,970 8,169 7,195 7,266 7,404 7,794
 
Table 10: New Female claimants, proportions, 1994-2004 (w/o DI conversions) 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 0.562 0.548 0.513 0.538 0.548 0.537 0.497 0.532 0.510 0.510 0.517
Age 63 0.160 0.161 0.135 0.143 0.140 0.142 0.134 0.151 0.151 0.142 0.144
Age 64 0.066 0.065 0.055 0.060 0.064 0.062 0.058 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.061
Age 65 0.158 0.173 0.149 0.162 0.163 0.178 0.203 0.205 0.216 0.223 0.181
Age 66 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.029 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.065
Age 67 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.022 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005
Age 68 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
Age 69 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.004
# of Claimants 4,934 5,115 5,675 5,545 5,711 6,079 6,806 6,410 6,442 6,695 7,057
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Figure 3: New male claimants of Social Security 



































Figure 4: New female claimants to Social Security 




































Table 11: Average monthly benefits of Male retired workers in dollars of 2005. Adjusted by the ARF and the DRC 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 1,203.60 1,176.75 1,179.96 1,208.52 1,233.06 1,302.46 1,315.69 1,352.61 1,402.60 1,414.35 1,356.50
Age 63 1,161.82 1,201.06 1,178.75 1,178.69 1,199.40 1,205.90 1,275.80 1,264.56 1,310.93 1,355.05 1,317.45
Age 64 1,209.15 1,212.80 1,227.03 1,206.12 1,209.64 1,223.97 1,240.47 1,322.56 1,344.97 1,359.56 1,354.08
Age 65 1,260.02 1,262.20 1,264.51 1,280.74 1,243.25 1,234.88 1,258.35 1,298.34 1,348.48 1,384.61 1,349.91
Age 66 1,333.34 1,176.89 1,275.72 1,201.11 1,279.76 1,286.73 1,331.57 944.09 856.84 1,157.49 1,300.07
Age 67 1,205.93 1,165.30 1,261.28 1,246.09 1,155.12 1,274.97 1,398.17 848.03 869.19 925.18 1,078.54
Age 68 1,062.62 1,050.64 1,191.53 1,217.22 1,238.22 1,183.47 1,367.90 918.91 922.04 679.81 678.86
Age 69 1,311.41 1,384.28 1,218.69 1,189.95 1,140.63 1,211.33 1,333.55 1,069.62 852.70 712.98 836.69
 
 
Table 12: Average monthly benefits of Female retired workers in dollars of 2005. Adjusted by the ARF and the DRC 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 926.15 899.80 897.24 889.07 890.88 921.42 905.06 931.88 938.98 946.07 908.38
Age 63 899.92 911.93 887.69 880.47 877.21 877.27 895.07 909.60 898.14 931.10 885.60
Age 64 916.81 930.03 912.09 886.62 869.56 908.99 925.39 944.52 988.25 965.87 958.82
Age 65 951.20 938.96 934.97 929.89 905.25 924.06 924.22 930.00 972.30 967.53 936.41
Age 66 943.55 896.61 956.38 920.27 947.29 941.04 983.33 823.85 867.93 813.65 918.73
Age 67 962.50 985.53 967.63 775.12 902.19 971.63 996.81 814.39 888.67 772.81 781.91
Age 68 988.59 829.98 808.16 778.87 823.43 949.39 925.39 785.52 662.28 789.03 822.48
Age 69 964.08 1,025.60 880.13 860.57 875.10 902.29 903.93 755.03 830.65 686.31 839.57
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Table 13: t-statistics of Social Security monthly benefits: Males 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 -8.0485 -12.0391 -12.0371 -7.5286 -3.7941 5.9236 7.4083 11.8172 17.6262 19.0840 12.9759
Age 63 -8.4427 -5.3728 -7.2258 -7.1668 -5.3725 -4.4740 1.3357 0.3633 3.9241 7.0243 4.3034
Age 64 -2.9746 -2.5950 -1.7915 -2.7834 -2.7543 -2.0273 -1.0789 3.4206 4.4613 5.0305 4.6576
Age 65  0.2006 0.3866 1.8398 -1.5491 -2.5098 -0.1983 4.3225 9.1668 12.5245 8.2154
Age 66 2.0553 -2.1057 0.5090 -1.4214 0.5129 0.3134 1.1297 -4.7461 -6.4202 -1.6187 2.2612
Age 67 -0.7686 -1.3756 0.0236 -0.2809 -1.7136 0.3304 4.7137 -5.6247 -4.1352 -3.5897 -1.8140
Age 68 -2.2183 -2.2577 -0.9059 -0.6648 -0.2784 -1.3099 2.9139 -3.2463 -3.2274 -6.9940 -5.2632
Age 69 0.7077 1.3259 -0.4890 -0.7212 -1.5169 -0.7593 1.5287 -1.8202 -4.0705 -5.3359 -2.2697
 
 
Table 14: t-statistics of Social Security monthly benefits: Females 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 -3.4522 -7.3715 -8.0576 -9.5225 -9.7547 -4.5862 -7.7022 -3.1238 -1.8326 -0.8112 -7.2473
Age 63 -4.1989 -3.0617 -5.0003 -6.1377 -6.2426 -6.4374 -4.8627 -3.6144 -4.7035 -1.7065 -5.7265
Age 64 -1.8202 -1.1164 -2.0471 -3.4191 -4.9134 -2.3718 -1.4572 -0.3752 2.0109 0.7440 0.4103
Age 65  -1.0684 -1.3725 -1.8117 -4.1544 -2.6010 -3.0871 -2.2322 2.1959 1.6526 -1.3827
Age 66 -0.1590 -1.1458 0.1371 -0.7715 -0.0952 -0.2981 1.1986 -1.9225 -1.6426 -2.8306 -2.0403
Age 67 0.2064 0.5236 0.3410 -3.1788 -1.1499 0.5223 1.4068 -2.6913 -0.8889 -3.1912 -2.4065
Age 68 0.4840 -1.7215 -2.9704 -3.2030 -2.5353 -0.0305 -0.5830 -2.8440 -5.1789 -2.4343 -2.3084
Age 69 0.1571 1.1702 -1.5565 -1.5437 -1.3517 -0.8516 -1.0374 -4.0480 -2.1660 -4.5948 -1.9692
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Table A1: Average PIA of new claimants. In dollars of 2005 (retired workers only) 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 940.78 926.23 935.13 953.19 973.71 1,034.55 1,046.03 1,080.50 1,127.71 1,142.03 1,103.01
Age 63 979.89 1,009.24 992.26 1,004.17 1,026.54 1,030.67 1,089.22 1,098.32 1,123.75 1,165.74 1,121.95
Age 64 1,018.19 1,021.65 1,047.72 1,013.85 1,012.43 1,039.77 1,061.02 1,135.15 1,154.62 1,165.67 1,181.94
Age 65 1,057.93 1,058.15 1,058.74 1,078.11 1,054.01 1,061.43 1,099.92 1,122.12 1,170.74 1,181.23 1,141.35
Age 66 1,136.01 1,026.72 1,101.08 1,053.64 1,121.91 1,124.77 1,232.29 887.25 856.65 986.29 1,172.39
Age 67 1,000.67 1,039.73 1,058.21 1,047.50 1,011.88 1,115.41 1,240.26 830.71 888.67 840.90 942.88
Age 68 1,001.07 941.18 977.90 969.08 992.46 1,078.06 1,222.81 845.29 757.86 751.68 796.67
Age 69 1,155.27 1,150.30 1,009.65 981.93 990.41 1,082.81 1,153.82 879.90 844.02 718.22 843.33
 
Table A2: t-statistics of PIA 
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Age 62 -20.9420 -24.2018 -23.1928 -19.2652 -15.3388 -4.1060 -2.0489 3.7583 10.8637 13.3432 7.7827
Age 63 -7.9977 -5.0899 -6.7459 -5.5853 -3.2251 -2.7561 3.1105 3.8991 6.1921 9.6267 5.8529
Age 64 -2.7804 -2.4186 -0.6552 -2.8275 -3.0307 -1.2372 0.2103 5.0466 6.1515 6.5032 7.8343
Age 65   0.0343 0.1227 3.0688 -0.6182 0.5818 7.4898 11.3957 19.3562 20.0700 12.4059
Age 66 2.5193 -1.0137 1.7775 -0.1488 2.2147 2.6307 9.5604 -3.7035 -5.0770 -1.6894 7.9571
Age 67 -1.2032 -0.3850 0.0076 -0.2610 -1.2481 1.7761 7.6716 -4.8227 -2.9185 -4.0269 -1.8268
Age 68 -1.0134 -1.9625 -1.6702 -1.8942 -1.4107 0.4820 5.1924 -3.7229 -5.8324 -5.6851 -4.9683
Age 69 1.6174 1.6602 -1.0627 -1.3864 -1.4350 0.5483 2.5446 -3.3092 -4.1866 -6.7483 -3.5572
 
